In the United States, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) use Systems Improvement Agreements (SIAs) to require transplant programs repeatedly flagged for poor-performance to improve performance or lose CMS funding for transplants. We identified 14 kidney transplant (KT) programs with SIAs and 28 KT programs without SIAs matched on waitlist volume and characterized kidney acceptance using SRTR data from 12/2006-3/2015. We used difference-in-differences linear regression models to identify changes in acceptance associated with an SIA independent of program variation and trends prior to the SIA. SIA programs accepted 26.9% and 22.1% of offers pre-and post-SIA, while non-SIA programs accepted 33.9% and 44.4% of offers in matched time periods. After adjustment for donor characteristics, time-varying waitlist volume, and secular trends, SIAs were associated with a 5.9 percentage-point (22%) decrease in kidney acceptance (95% CI: −10.9 to −0.8, P = .03). The decrease in acceptance post-SIA was more pronounced for KDPI 0-40 kidneys (12.3 percentage-point decrease, P = .007); reductions in acceptance of higher KDPI kidneys occurred pre-SIA. Programs undergoing SIAs substantially reduced acceptance of kidney offers for waitlisted candidates. Attempts to improve posttransplant outcomes might have the unintended consequence of reducing access to transplantation as programs adopt more restrictive organ selection practices.
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While studies have examined the response to a poor performance flag, [2] [3] [4] transplant program responses to SIAs, which are a much more aggressive regulatory action, have not been studied.
Transplant programs might respond to SIA requirements to improve posttransplant outcomes by becoming more conservative in their transplant practices. [5] [6] [7] One way to change behavior is to change patterns of acceptance of organs offered for transplantation. In particular, transplant programs might avoid organs that they perceive will be associated with worse than expected posttransplant outcomes. Since CMS participation depends only on posttransplant outcomes, programs may let transplant rates and waitlist mortality rates worsen while taking steps to ensure high rates of patient and graft survival posttransplant.
Because SIAs represent the final opportunity for programs to demonstrate improved performance before losing their largest payer (and potentially other payers as a result), we tested whether these strong incentives to improve posttransplant outcomes influence kidney acceptance patterns. 6, 8 Specifically, we used a difference-in-differences approach, a robust econometric method previously used to identify changes associated with regulatory and policy changes, [9] [10] [11] to isolate the net effect of undergoing an SIA on program-level practices. Using this method, we characterized kidney offer acceptance before and after the start of the SIA among 14 programs undergoing SIAs and compared changes to patterns observed irrespective of the SIA among 28 non-SIA programs matched on waitlist volume between 2009 and 2013.
| ME THODS

| Data source
This study used data from the Scientific Registry of Transplant Recipients (SRTR) external release made available in October 2017.
The SRTR data system includes data on all donors, waitlisted candidates, and transplant recipients in the United States, submitted by members of the OPTN, and has been described elsewhere. 12 The HRSA, US Department of Health and Human Services, provides oversight to the activities of the OPTN and SRTR contractors. We 
| Study population
We identified 14 kidney transplant programs that underwent an SIA excluded as they represent a subset of kidney offers that were administratively distinct from typical deceased-donor offers.
Offers that were accepted but not ultimately transplanted were considered declines. Finally, we aimed to characterize acceptance of offers deemed acceptable by at least one center, and thus, only offers of kidneys that were eventually transplanted were included in the analysis.
| Changes in kidney offer acceptance following an SIA
To determine the change in probability of offer acceptance following an SIA, we used difference-in-difference (DID) linear probability regression models. DID models are an econometrics technique increasingly used to study the effects of policy interventions, including efforts to improve surgical quality. [9] [10] [11] [13] [14] [15] In the context of this study, there are persistent differences between KT programs and common time trends affecting all programs that must be accounted for in order to isolate the effect of the SIA. Thus, by including both treated (SIA) and control programs (non-SIA) in a pre-post design with program fixed effects, we can account for underlying differences across SIA versus non-SIA programs and for common acceptance trends over time to estimate the net effect of an SIA on offer acceptance. The fixed effect for each program controls for persistent but unobserved program characteristics (such as patient socioeconomic status and surgeon practice style).
The model accounts for clustering at the program level, and was adjusted for donor factors associated with refusal and discard 16 :
donor age, sex, race, stroke, diabetes, hypertension, increased infectious risk status, donation after cardiac death, creatinine >1. we also report the average number of DDKTs per month over the study period for SIA and non-SIA programs using Lowess curves regressed over months.
| Robustness check
To determine whether our inferences were dependent on 2:1 matching, we performed a sensitivity analysis and identified 10 non-SIA programs with replacement for each SIA program. In this analysis, rather than match on waitlist volume, the programs were matched solely on follow-up time.
| Statistical analysis
Analyses were performed using Stata 14.2 (College Station, TX).
We used a two-sided α of 0.05 to indicate a statistically significant difference.
| RE SULTS
| Waitlist volume
Two years prior to undergoing an SIA, the 14 selected SIA programs had a mean waitlist volume of 531 (252) and the 28 matched non-SIA programs had a mean (SD) waitlist volume of 572 (238).
Mean waitlist volume then decreased over time to 348 (159) among SIA programs and increased to 819 (315) among non-SIA programs ( Figure 1A ).
| Kidney offer acceptance
The mean number of offers made to SIA programs decreased from per month two years after the SIA, while DDKT volume per month remained unchanged among non-SIA programs ( Figure 1C ).
| Kidney offer acceptance by KDPI
In the pre-SIA period, the 14 SIA programs accepted 38.4%, 25.3%, and 14.3% of kidneys with KDPI 0 to 40, 41 to 80, and 81 to 100, respectively ( Table 2 ). In the post-SIA period, SIA programs accepted TA B L E 1 Percentage point change in the probability of kidney offer acceptance at programs before and after undergoing a Systems Improvement Agreement (SIA) The change in probability of acceptance of kidney offers associated with the SIA is the difference-in-differences estimate comparing SIA to non-SIA programs. The non-SIA programs allow for adjustment of time-dependent trends in kidney acceptance occurring independent of regulatory involvement. Difference-in-differences model adjusted for calendar time, time-varying waitlist volume, time-invariant program factors, deceased-donor characteristics, and a linear time trend interacted with SIA status. 95% CI based on program level cluster-robust standard errors.
TA B L E 2
Percentage point change in probability of kidney offer acceptance at programs before and after undergoing a Systems Improvement Agreement (SIA) stratified by KDPI of the kidney offer (Table 2) . 
| Robustness check
| D ISCUSS I ON
In this national level study of kidney offer acceptance, we identi- findings indicate that programs narrowed donor selection for more marginal donors prior to the SIA but that following SIA implementation there was a substantial drop in acceptance of higher quality kidneys beyond any changes made prior to the SIA.
We report that the probability of kidney offer acceptance was reduced by 5.9 percentage points (22%) above and beyond any changes the programs might have made prior to the SIA. While we did observe new declines in acceptance among higher KDPI kidneys at SIA onset, programs may have initiated such practices in response to CMS flagging well before SIA onset. And, while increased donor selectivity at higher values of KDPI might make sense for centers attempting to improve posttransplant outcomes if programs believed that these organs could not be adequately risk adjusted, we also observed that the probability of accepting KDPI 0 to 40 kidneys declined by 12.3 percentage points following the SIA. It is important to note that KDPI was not available for each donor until March 2012, and thus, we retrospectively calculated KDPI as a measure of donor quality that these programs were willing to accept and transplant, however programs did have information on donor quality with each offer during the study period.
Our findings are consistent with those of Schold et al who observed reductions in overall and marginal transplant volume following performance flags. 4 The pronounced declines in acceptance that we observed following an SIA were above and beyond any precautionary changes made following receipt of a second poor performance flag. Our findings were also consistent with those of White et al who observed reductions in extended-criteria, standard criteria, and living donor transplants at programs facing ongoing noncompliance. 3 Similarly, we observed declines over the study period in acceptance of poorer quality organs, despite the survival benefit they can provide, 17 although we did not observe an additional reduction in acceptance of these organs following the SIA. Similar to White et al's findings with respect to higher quality organs, we also observed a substantial reduction in acceptance of higher quality kidneys, and this reduction was in excess of any trends occurring prior to the SIA. Beyond changes in transplant volume, however, we were able to use offer data to show that SIA programs were actively turning down organs that were available for their patients and might have provided survival benefit. 18 While lower organ acceptance rates among SIA programs indicates reduced access to transplant among patients waitlisted at SIA KT programs, it is important to note that national transplant volume would not have increased had SIA programs accepted these kidneys, as we studied only kidneys that were eventually accepted and transplanted. Kidney offers that were never transplanted were excluded to avoid punishing programs for turning down organs that no program was willing to use. However, few candidates multilist, even after notification that their program is undergoing an SIA, 19 and so it is unlikely that candidates sought improved access elsewhere while their original center accepted fewer kidney offers during the SIA. It is also worth noting that the matched non-SIA KT programs included KT programs with no active flags and programs that might have had at least one poor performance flag but no SIA. These programs were included in the potential set of KT programs as they represent the real world of KT programs with which SIA regulatory involvement should be compared. The non-SIA KT programs might have undergone changes in practice related to flagging or applying for mitigating factors, but changes of this nature would bias our findings towards the null, and yet we still observed a net reduction in acceptance associated with an SIA. Furthermore, our sensitivity analysis indicated that the significant reductions in offer acceptance following an SIA
were not dependent on the non-SIA programs included as control programs in the difference-in-differences model.
In addition, the number of offers made to SIA and non-SIA programs decreased over time, which we would expect to drive up the probability of acceptance. Yet the decline in acceptance post-SIA was robust to declining waitlist volume, secular trends, and to any declines occurring at programs prior to the SIA. The methods we used to identify offers (and the definition of acceptance) were similar to those of Wey et al's study of organ offers 20 ; however, we included one decision per donor per program, rather than all declines.
This method was designed to isolate the decision to accept a donor at the program-level rather than the candidate level, in which case programs might be penalized for declining the kidney for multiple patients when they ultimately accepted and transplanted the kidney in a candidate lower on their list.
The limitations of the study merit consideration. We were unable to determine who made the decision to accept or decline each organ offer; however, the main goal of the analysis was to capture center acceptance of offers, and not to discern particular patient characteristics with each offer decision. It is possible that our findings are not driven by the SIA itself, but an unobserved third factor. However, we controlled for persistent characteristics of SIA KT programs, timevarying waitlist volume, time trends common to all programs and differential rates of acceptance among SIA programs that persist across the pre and post period. It is unlikely that there is another unrelated factor that consistently occurs at the same time as an SIA that could account for these results. We do not have kidney biopsy information and other details made available to the transplant surgeon at the time of the offer through OPTN data; however, the kidneys studied were eventually used for transplant, and thus, these unmeasured clinical factors might explain some but not all of why these kidneys were declined by some centers and not by others. Additionally, programs might have restricted acceptance of donors based on factors not included in risk adjustment in order to improve adjusted outcomes. Thus, there might be additional changes in acceptance by donor quality we were unable to isolate.
In this national study of KT program offer acceptance, we found that KT programs undergoing the most severe form of regulatory involvement, an SIA, significantly reduced their probability of accepting kidney organ offers for candidates on their waitlists. SIAs were associated with a significant reduction in acceptance of kidneys with KDPI 0-40, despite the survival benefit these kidneys can provide.
KT programs attempting to improve posttransplant outcomes might be inadvertently reducing access to transplant for candidates on their waitlists.
